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PRIVACY v. SECURITY AND DISCIPLINE
AT THE
ACADEMIC INSTITUTION
Patrick J. McDonough*
Rights attained and clarified under the Fourth
Amendment have been considerable in recent years. The
major thrust of the liberal trend has been to shift
the focus and emphasis of Fourth Amendment protections
in respect to searches and seizures from property
rights to the right of privacy. However, it appears
that students have attained little in this regard.
If one subject to a search and seizure were not
a student, a warrantless general search would prove un-
constitutional.2 Evidence seized would be inadmissible
in either civil or criminal proceedings.3 Actually,
few students engage in illegal activities. However,
significant numbers store and consume alcoholic bever-
ages in their rooms, entertain guests of the opposite
sex, and so on in violation of college regulations. A
warrantless search in pursuance to these violations
may jeopardize a student's entire future. It is esti-
mated that a college graduate earns $100,000 more in a
lifetime than one who completes up to three years.4
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The two-pronged result of expulsion and criminal pro-
ceedings based upon evidence seized, may become the
source of a life-long stigma for the student.
An institutional prerogative to maintain campus
order and discipline has been offered as a rationale
for abrogating students' Fourth Amendment protections.
However, in the absence of obvious necessity or special
circumstances, such reasoning fails to justify searches
and seizures by other administrative authorities,
6
despite the argument that college students who reside
in a dormitory have a special relationship with the
college, which does not depend upon the general theory
of privacy or the traditional property concepts of the
Fourth Amendment.
The Dormitory Question
One leading case interpreting the Fourth iimend-
ment in the context of school regulations on searches
and seizures is an early California decision, People
v. Kelly.8 Kelly held that a school's right of entry
is an implicit right reserved in the school to enable
it to properly enforce discipline in the dormitories.
9
Generally, such early cases supported the view that
the Constitution placed few restrictions on a school's
10ability to inspect student areas.
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The District Court in Moore v. Student Affairs
Committee held that the state university regulation
that, "the college reserves the right to enter rooms
for inspection purposes', was facially reasonable as
necessary to the institution's performance in its
duty to operate the school as an educational insti-
11
tution. In Moore, an informer's tip, just prior to
the departure of most students for vacation, prompted
a search of a student's room by the Dean of Students,
two Federal Narcotics agents, and the Chief of Police,
with the student present, but without his consent.
!iiarijuana was found, and the result was expulsion from
the college and criminal prosecution.
1 2
The two theories traditionally advanced to estab-
lish the autonomy of college administrators were: in
loco parentis, which applied to all educational insti-
tutions, and the special contractual relationship be-
tween the student and the institution,1 3 especially in
regard to private educational institutions. In the
absence of a clear showing of bad faith or abuse of
discretion, the courts have refused to interfere with
college administration and discipline under the i.e.p.
theory.1  The second theory established that colleges
were under no duty to accept all willing and qualified
applicants, and, consequently, admission may become
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condition to students' voluntary waiver of certain
rights in deference to the institution's own rules.
15
Neither one of these theories is valid today. A
college does not stand in loco parentis to its stu-
dents, nor is their relationship purely contractual in
the traditional sense.1 6 Students, many of whom are
over 21, should be considered responsible only to
themselves, and are in attendance at colleges to ob-
tain an education, not to be disciplined--thus negating
the first theory. The contract theory has been dis-
pelled, at least in regard to public institutions, in
holdings that no agency or institution acting for the
government has power to adopt an unconstitutional rule
or procedure, even though it may have been specifically
authorized by statute to do so.1 7
It is clear that Constitutional rights, including
the right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure, can be waived. However, the Supreme Court
requires a high standard of proof to establish such a
waiver. 18 In regard to students specifically, it must
be shown that the student was aware of the protections
of the Fourth Amendment when he signed a housing con-
tract and that he signed with the express intention of
waiving Fourth Amendment rights.1 9 Moore established
that the validity of a regulation authorizing a search
of dormitories does not depend on whether the student
waives his right to Fourth Amendment protection or on
whether he has contracted it away. The Court in Moore
depended on the notion espoused in Dickey v. Alabama
State, that the aim should be toward an environ-
ment suited to education:
"...rules and regulations must be reasonable,
Courts may only consider whether rules and
regulations are a reasonable exercise of the
power and discretion vested in those author-
ities, Regulations and rules which are neces-
ary in maintaining order and discipline are
always considered reasonable." 2 0
The demise of the contract theory cuts in favor
of the administration in the particular situation of
Mloore.
"University officials may search a student's
dormitory room without violating Fourth
Amendment rights when the official has a rea-
sonable cause to believe that he is fulfill-
ing an affirmative obligation to maintain
campus order and discipline. The fact that
the student rents a room does not abridge
the college administrator's right to search
... "21
Moreover, the court determined that the validity of a
search and seizure rests not upon waiver via contract,
but upon whether it was a reasonable exercise of the
college's supervisory power.22 Further benefit to
college officials comes in the holding that:
"...the standard of 'reasonable cause to be-
lieve' is lower than the constitutionally
protected criminal law standard of 'proba-
tion cause, because of the special necessi-
ties of the student-administration relation-
ship and because college disciplinary pro-
ceedings are criminal proceedings in the
Constitutional sense. This remains true even
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the search's sole purpose is to seek evi-
dence of suspected violations of law."2 3
Thus, the boundary line between the right of a school
to z;earch and the right of a student to privacy is
!reasonable cause to believe" on the part of the col-
lege that the student is using his room improperly.
24
Moore seems to possess the fault of saying too much...
to the point of being paradoxical in part. The two
bases for the decision, as seen above, were extracted
from other cases:
1) necessity for maintaining order and disci-
pline requiring reasonable regulations
allowing inspection (People v. Overton.)
2) college disciplinary proceedings are not
criminal proceedings, in the constitutional
sense,26 and, thus, do not require an appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule (Dixon v.
Alabama).27
But the court confused the issue by saying that the
search was reasonable anyway, and any student who
lrents a room waives objection to any reasonable
search conducted pursuant to reasonable and necessary
regulations. 28
The Secondary School Locker
Secondary schools have depended on Overton29 as
their main source of authority on the point of searches
and seizures. The highly celebrated case, In re
Gault,3 0 supplied the notion that a student naturally
has the right to be free of unreasonable searches and
seizures. Overton concerned the search of a junior
high school student's locker for marijuana. A vice-
principal had given consent to search two students and
their lockers to three detectives armed with an in-
valid search warrant.3 1 The trial court found that
the vice-principal and the school had dominion over
the locker, and that the invalid search warrant was
irrelevant.3 2  On appeal, the Appellate Term found
that the search was illegal and could not be justified
upon the theory of consent on the part of the vice-
principal.
33
The cn"j-t's opinion was based upon an earlier de-
cision which held that depositories, such as lockers
or desks, were safeguarded from unreasonable searches
for evidence of a crime.34 However, the Court of
Appeals of New York twice overturned the lower court's
opinion,3 5 once upon remand by the U. S. Supreme
Court 3 6 for reconsideration in light of Bumper v.
North Carolina.
37
The ultimate holding in Overton was the finding
that there was an affirmative obligation on the part
of the school authorities to investigate any charge
that a student is using or possessing narcotics and to
take appropriate steps if the charge is substantiated d
Further, the Court said that the student's exclusivity,
according to purpose, was vis-a-vis other students,
not school authorities. 3 9 Justice Bergan dissented
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both times on grounds that the search, upon which
there was reliance by the vice-principal forcing con-
sent, was bad and subsequently the search was invalid,
and that the school did not control the locker since
the student paid for its use.4 0
THE WAY IT IS
Generally, it may be inferrred from Overton that
a reasonable right of inspection of school property
and premises, even though it may be set aside for the
exclusive use of a particular student, is also the
duty of secondary school officials. Overton and Moore
have subsequently gone hand-in-hand. In fact, Moore,
although recognizing differences existing between dis-
cretionary requirements of high school and college
students stated:
'No distinction can be drawn between funda-
mental duties of educators at both levels
to maintain appropriate discipline.",41
Moreover, Moore and Overton, in holding that a reason-
able right of inspection is necessary to the perform-
ance of the institution's duty to maintain control and
discipline, serve to justify searches even though they
may infringe on the outer boundaries of a student's
Fourth Amendment rights. Under Moore's standard of a
'ireasonable cause to believe' there must be a showing
that the infringement by the school's regulation is
necessary for the school to be able to maintain
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order---only a showing of necessity will justify the
rule.4 2 Following Overton strictly, the school is
justified in inspection simply by its control over
the premises.
4 3
On the basis of the above-mentioned cases, the
student dormitory room in a tax-supported public
university may be reasonably searched without a war-
rant and without student's consent, provided a univer-
sity official authorizes the search.4  The same holds
for secondary schools via Overton. There are, however,
no cases directly on point regarding private institu-
tions. Generally, it would seem from the above, that
rule-making would be afforded greater discretion and
freedom in non-public schools.
It is predictable that more will be handed down
in the area of searches and seizures in student areas
in the near future. The dichotomy between on and off-
campus students which results from the fact that the
latter are protected by the Fourth hmendment as are all
the other citizens, while the former, in renting campus
rooms, are unprotected, may produce two classes of
university citizens and a breakdown in the community.
Reference to cases such as West Virginia Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnetic, which held that state actions must
be tempered by respect for students' fundamental con-
stitutional rights,4 5 the celebrated Tinker case,
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holding that, "School officials do not possess abso-
lute authority over students. Students in school,
as well as out of school, are "persons' under our Con-
stitution."4 6 , and Dixon, which held that students are
entitled to fundamental due process of law,4 7 will be-
come commonplace. One writer in paraphrasing Katz
4 8
has stated:
"A student has a justifiable expectation of
the private use of his room because one who
occupies it, locks the door, and pays the
rent is surely entitled to assume that his
activities inside will not be revealed to
the world. '49
Thus, the stage is set for further clashing of inter-
ests: privacy v. maintaining an academic institution's
security and discipline. Although it appears that high
school students are more active today than ever before
in asserting their demands, life on the college cam-
puses has been tempered by apathy for almost two years.
The apex of dissent was reached in spring, 1970, but
now the atmosphere has reverted to a mood similar to
the pre-Peace Movement period. There are many causes,
some substantiated and some only theorized, for this
phenomenon. Regardless of the causes, for the pur-
pose of this paper, the phenomenon is relevant as it
seems that questions generally involving student-
administration relationships regarding school regula-
tions and academic freedom are raised and have an
impact proportional to the activism among students.
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Thus, it may be concluded that the clashes between
students and school administrators, at least at the
college level, and in particular the clash over
searches and seizures will largely hinge on the po-
tentiality of a renewed atmosphere of dissent on the
campuses. Until such time, the general situation is
that no student dormitory resident (or locker user)
may claim protection under the Fourth Amendment, as
individual rights to privacy and property remain unde-
veloped in the university community.5 0 No court has
yet conceded a student's total right to privacy.
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